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ABSTRACT

ii
It is argued that dairying is vital to future viability of many small farms in East
Africa and that high transactions costs for dairy production and marketing limit
participation by asset- and information-poor smallholders. Case studies from Kenya
and Ethiopia illustrate the role of dairy cooperatives in reducing transactions costs.
Analysis of the determinants of producer prices received by a sample of dairy
producers near Addis Ababa suggests that different levels of access to
infrastructure, assets, and information explain why different households
contemporaneously accept widely different producer prices for fluid milk.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As in the rest of the developing world, increased domestic dairy production by
smallholders has the potential in much of Africa to generate income and
employment on a wide scale, and thus to improve the welfare of populations on an
economically sustainable basis (Walshe et al., 1991, Winrock International, 1992).
In peri-urban areas around the world where cattle are present, dairy typically has
been part of the adjustment of production patterns when smallholder farmers have
been faced with shrinking arable land, higher population density, and rising wage
rates. Under such conditions, dairy farming may be one of the few agricultural
activities that can provide enough income to maintain the economic viability of
smallholder farming.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, smallholder agriculture still accounts for the majority
of livelihoods, yet has been subjected in recent years to increasing strains as a
viable source of income generation. Nevertheless, it is striking that smallholder
peri-urban dairy development has not been widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa
outside of the East African highlands, particularly given the importance of livestock
in African farming systems.
This paper will attempt to apply insights from the New Institutional Economics
to investigate a key issue of public policy for African countries, which are searching
for ways to promote the inclusion of large numbers of smallholder farmers in the
benefits offered by structural adjustment policies, even as they bear the costs of
adjustment out of previously subsidized activities that are no long viable at the farm
level. The paper will first argue that in peri-urban areas of Africa (150 km or less
from the capital city) where cattle already are kept, dairy offers high potential as a
smallholder diversification activity. In such areas, dairy is technically feasible, yet
typically not widespread, and recent and on-going structural changes are improving
its profitability.
Second, the paper hypothesizes that growth in smallholder dairying is limited
by especially high transactions costs for both production and marketing of dairy
products by smallholder farmers in Africa. Understanding the nature of these
constraints and how they can be alleviated is central to using dairy development as
a tool to improve rural livelihoods in peri-urban areas. In African economies that are
only partly commercialized, smallholder farmers are likely to face higher
transactions costs than larger producers. These may result from inadequate access
to market information, for example, needed to enter into new activities that structural
change has rendered profitable on paper. Transactions costs thus help explain why
aggregate agricultural supply response to relative price changes is often quite slow
in Africa (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1992; Delgado, 1995).
Third, the paper hypothesizes that differential levels of transactions costs
across producers in what appears on the surface to be a single "market" (Le fluid
milk in Addis Ababa at time t) explains why producers habitually accept widely
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different prices for a seemingly homogenous good in the same location and time
period. A variety of market outlets for milk exist, different producers supply different
outlets, and some producers supply several different ones simultaneously at
different prices.
Fourth, the paper argues that producer-level institutions such as cooperatives
and contracts with buyers playa central role in reducing transactions costs where
market dairy activity is observed. Indigenous institutions and organizations1 typically
have evolved to reduce the costs of transactions among agents in the dairy
marketing chain. It is vital to better document the nature of these institutions and
organizations, and to study if alternatives need to be encouraged to promote dairy
development.
These assertions will be investigated in case studies for Kenya and Ethiopia,
where smallholder dairy is much more prevalent than in the rest of Africa. The
highland climate in Kenya and Ethiopia is relatively favorable to grade dairy cattle
crossed with indigenous stock. This in part explains the development of dairy in
general and smallholder dairying in particular in those zones. However, the role of
institutional and other policy factors in supporting smallholder livestock development
in Kenya has been key, and the role of economic liberalization is currently affecting
that development in both Kenya and Ethiopia.

II.

A NEW ERA FOR DAIRY IN AFRICA?

Dairy production added roughly $2 billion to Africa's GDP at the end of the
1980's, and probably more at today's much higher world prices (Walshe et al.,
1991). More than 7 million metric tons of milk were produced annually in the late
1980's (Table 1) in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, excluding South Africa. Per capita
consumption of dairy products has been estimated at 27 kg per year (Table 1).
The well-known bias in trade and macroeconomic policies against agriculture
in Africa in the second half of the 1970's and the first half of the

For our purposes, institutions are defined as the rules and expectations governing
exchanges, and organizations are defined as formal or informal groupings of
economic agents.

1
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Table 1: Selected Characteristics of the Dairy Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Region

Eastern

Milking
Cows
(000)

Total Cow's
Milk Production
(000 MT)

1988

1988

Production per
capita (kg all
dairy productsa)
1970

Imports per
capita b (kg)

1987

1970

1987

53.8

1.2

2.3

14,468

4,959

Kenya

2,255

1,015

50.3

0.2

Ethiopia

3,875

815

21.9

1.7

Tanzania

2,800

378

20.5

0.9

Uganda

1,080

448

22.4

1.0

Western

4,496

1,071

Nigeria

1,220

360

Southern C

1,669

720

Zimbabwe

143

225

Central

669

311

Angola

295

148

21,302

7,061

Total

59.1

14.3

8.1

3.7

1.9

3.5
20.0

13.0

5.0

24.9
7.1

4.8

22.2

6.2
0.5

2.0

16.1
27.0

5.1

4.4
14.9

2.8

4.3

alncludes cow, sheep, and goat milk.
bBased on liquid milk equivalents.
cExcludes South Africa.
Sources:

Walshe, et al. (1991) and ILeA (1993), various tables, using FAO data.
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1980's was continued for livestock products well into the 1990's, particularly in
West Africa (Williams, 1993). This occurred despite meaningful policy reforms
in the second half of the 1980's affecting agricultural incentives as a whole. This
differential effect for livestock products was due in no small part to the availability
of heavily subsidized low grade frozen meat, milk powder and butter oil from
developed countries. Besides the usual impediments to internal agricultural trade
in sub-Saharan Africa (such as official and unofficial taxation), small-scale peri
urban dairy producers also have had to contend with poor infrastructure for handling
perishable produce, and parastatal milk collection systems which passed on much
of their excessive costs to producers, or used their market power to squeeze
producer profits (Staal and Shapiro, 1994).
The economic and political environment for growth in many countries of sub
Saharan Africa has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s. Modifications to
domestic and external policies are likely to have improved the incentives for
domestic agricultural production in general, and dairy production in particular.
Structural adjustment programs have wrought changes in agricultural sector, trade,
and exchange-rate policies. These economic changes have improved the financial
profitability of the peri-urban dairy production systems in some countries, such as
Kenya (Staal, 1995; Staal and Shapiro, 1994; Williams, 1993), although this
remains to be established in others. Domestic resource cost (DRC) analysis in
Kenya, for example, shows that Kenya holds a strong comparative advantage in
dairying with respect to world markets (Staal 1995).
Countries of the North have become more sensitive to the impact of their
surplus management policies on the poorer countries of the South. International
trade liberalization, such as reform of the European Union's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and the GATT agreement, changes in US dairy policy, and the
reduction of subsidies on dairy exports from Western Europe, are all expected to
reduce world milk surpluses. Further, these reductions have not been offset by a
flood of exports once expected from the liberalization of the former CIS and Eastern
European economies. Policies in Europe and the U.S. were largely responsible for
the world price of skim-milk powder falling to $600/metric ton in 1985, rising to
$2,000 in early 1989, and falling to $1,300 in 1990 (Nell, 1992). Currently, the price
is well above $2,000 and projections are that world market prices for dairy products
will not decline substantially in the near future (FAD, 1994). To the extent that
exchange rate reform and trade liberalization allow higher international prices to be
expressed domestically, incentives for domestic dairy production are likely to be
improving.
Further improvements in incentives for domestic dairy production are also
likely in coming years due to rapidly growing and increasingly urban populations. In
sub-Saharan Africa, per capita dairy product demand grew about 2 percent per
annum over the 1960's and 1970's, then stagnated during the 1980's (Walshe et al.,
1991, Winrock International, 1992; Rosegrant, Agacaoili-Sombilla, and Perez 1995).
Dairy imports in Sub-Saharan Africa grew from 2.3 kg/capita in 1970 to 4.3
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kg.lcapita in 1987. Higher world market prices and domestic policy reform may
enable local dairy producers to lessen the gap between domestic production and
consumption.
Dairy production by smallholders in several peri-urban areas of Africa does
appear to be growing in response to changes in the economic environment,
although response rates appear to vary across regions and types of producers
(Brokken and Seyoum, 1992; Shapiro et al., 1995). Smallholders, however, may
be having greater difficulty than larger commercial farmers in profiting from the new
opportunities. Smallholder dairy production and marketing in Africa appear to have
been limited by transactions costs and the inadequacy of the institutions and
organizations governing exchanges of raw milk and home-produced dairy products
to deal with them.

III.

TRANSACTIONS COSTS AND SMALLHOLDER RESPONSIVENESS TO
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT FOR DAIRY

The notion that the costs of arranging exchange may reduce or even prevent
exchanges from occurring, and may give rise to institutions and organizations to
offset their negative impacts, is now widely accepted (Williamson, 1985; Bardhan,
1989; De Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet, 1991; Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz,
1995; Jaffee, 1995). Transactions costs include, inter alia, the costs of searching
for a partner with whom to exchange, screening potential trading partners to
ascertain their trustworthiness, bargaining with potential trading partners (and, in
some cases, officials who can hold up trade) to reach an agreement, transferring
the product (this typically involves transportation, processing, packaging, and
securing title, if necessary), monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are
fulfilled, and enforcing (or seeking damages for any violation of) the exchange
agreement.

A.

Milk as a Commodity Subject to High Transactions Costs

The nature of milk and its derivatives in part explains the transactions costs
associated with exchanges of dairy products. First, raw milk is highly perishable,
and thus requires rapid transportation to consumption centers or for processing into
less perishable forms. This may limit marketing options for small and remote dairy
producers, and implies greater losses due to spoilage than for commodities such
as grains. Because milk production typically is a year-round activity, dairy producers
often must be concerned with maintaining outlets for their production. The search
for stable market outlets by producers is complicated by what is often significant
seasonal variation in milk production and dairy product consumption (Jaffee, 1995;
Debrah and Anteneh, 1991).
In addition, raw milk is a "bulky" commodity. Raw milk is typically more than
85 percent water, implying relatively high transportation costs per unit, and limiting
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the quantities that can be marketed by individual households or groups of them
without vehicular transport. In part due to high perishability, but also due to natural
variation, milk composition and quality is variable and often not easily ascertained.
This implies costs for monitoring milk quality and potential losses by traders,
processors, and consumers when milk is spoiled or adulterated. The lack of easily
measurable quality standards may also allow agents purchasing raw milk from
producers to reject milk without just cause when they have contracted to purchase
more milk than can be profitably sold 2 .
Finally, raw milk can be transformed into numerous products, such as butter
and cheese, and often this is performed by producer households themselves. Such
processing increases the value per kilogram of finished product and lengthens the
time before spoilage. This reduces transport and storage costs, even if the returns
per kilogram of fresh milk input are lower. On the other hand, price differentials for
quality tend to be higher for processed products. Butter and cheese production is
in fact typically a reflection of the lack of availability of marketing outlets for raw milk,
and a reflection of the high transactions costs of milk marketing.

B.

Difficulties in Observation

Perhaps the limited empirical evidence on the nature and importance of
transactions costs for East African dairying is due to a number of conceptual and
measurement difficulties. First, when transactions costs are high enough to prevent
exchanges from occurring, by definition the costs cannot be obseNed because no
transaction exists. A related issue is that the nature of transactions costs for
"obseNed" transactions is likely to be different than that for "prohibitive" transactions
costs. If policy inteNentions are to be designed to promote entry by producers into
certain activities that are not currently undertaken (by lowering the associated
transactions costs), obseNed transactions costs may not provide much of a guide.
In addition, obseNed transactions costs may not provide a full measure of the
opportunities for dairy development under alternative institutional or organizational
structures. For example, if producers limit milk production in response to market
outlet risk, thereby limiting their exposure to such risk, the nature of obseNed
transactions costs due to market outlet risk may be small, but the behavioral
implications of market outlet risk for overall production may, in fact, be large.
Costs associated with organizing and enforcing institutions of exchange are
inherently difficult to document. Even transactions costs that are, in principle,
obseNable may often be designated as "overhead" in firms maintaining records of
such costs. Finally, accurate assessment of obseNable transactions costs and their
behavioral implications implies a significant commitment of resources for data

There is anecdotal evidence that the parastatal Kenya Cooperative Creameries
(KCC), a designated buyer of last resort that has generally lost money in recent
years, engages in such practices.
2
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collection. This is due to the need to examine all agents (not just producers) in what
are often diverse marketing channels, simultaneously and for a period of time
sufficient to capture inter-seasonal variation in costs and marketing decisions. To
date, few if any studies have provided detailed empirical evidence on the nature and
implications of transactions costs, even for producer households.
The few extant studies dealing empirically with transactions costs have instead
attempted to infer the magnitude of transactions costs, based on the observed
behavior of participating and non-participating agents in the marketing channels
(Goetz, 1992). When detailed data on transactions costs themselves are not
available, a reasonable first step is to look for evidence of lack of commercialization,
as evidence of "prohibitive" transactions costs. Tell-tale signs are an activity
involving significant numbers of producers and for which imports of the product are
sold, but for which a low percentage of domestic production is commercialized. 3 For
dairying in Africa, the evidence of behavioral implications of transactions costs is
clear. Only a small portion of African dairy production is marketed. In Ethiopia,
which has significant per capita milk production, only 5 percent of estimated national
production was commercialized in the early 1990's (Staal, 1995). In Kenya, the
African country with the largest number of smallholder dairy producers selling milk
off-farm, estimates of commercialization in 1990 range from 43-48 percent (Table
2 and Jaffee, 1995). Visits to Central Province in Kenya by the authors in early
1996 confirmed that even when producers can sell "morning milk,,4, the "evening
milk"

This is consistent with the conceptual framework in de Janvry, Fafchamps and
Sadoulet (1991), in that the existence of transactions costs stemming from
imperfect factor markets makes the production item (milk) non-tradable. Producers
are then less responsive to external markets through production of the item.
Instead adjustment to relative price changes occurs either in the labor market or
linked product markets, such as food.

3

4 Many smallholder dairy producers in Kenya milk twice a day. "Morning milk" is
from the morning milking, "evening milk" is from the evening milking.
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Table 2:

Evolution of Selected Characteristics of the Dairy Industry in Kenya,
1979-1990.
Smallholders
and Pastoralists

Medium-scale
Farmers

Large-scale
Farmers

Total or
Average

Total production (millions of liters)
1979
769
193
1990 (est)
-------------------1 ,577--------------

196
253

1,158
1830

Percentage consumed at home or fed to calves
1979
57
33
1990 (est)
--------------------- 66 ---------------

8
8

44

Percentage sold to KCC (Dairy Parastatal)
1979
11
25
1990 (est)
------------------25-------------------

81
81

20
33

57

Sources and caveats: Data for 1979 are from Jaffee (1995) and are from Kenya's
Integrated Rural Surveys 1976-1979. Estimates for 1990 are heuristic, and are
based on estimates in Republic of Kenya (1993) and anecdotal accounts.
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often must be consumed at home or sold at a lower price. Estimates for several
other countries in West and Central Africa range from 25 to 40 percent of milk sold
off the farm (Metzger et aI., 1995).
It seems likely that smallholder farmers consume a higher percentage of their
milk production than do larger farmers. This is borne out by the sketchy evidence
available for Kenya (Table 2). These stylized facts are consistent with the view that
smallholders face higher transactions costs in milk marketing than do larger
farmers, but further study would be needed to better document this conclusion.
The magnitude and impacts of transactions costs can also be inferred from
the milk marketing behavior of producers of various sizes in differing locations.
Debrah and Anteneh (1991) show that larger dairy producers tend to sell relatively
more to institutional clients--hotels, restaurants, government--than do small
producers (Table 3). Similar results can be observed in coastal Kenya (Staal and
Mullins, forthcoming). Selling directly to institutional clients may allow larger
producers reduce other transactions costs such as searching, monitoring,
bargaining, etc. Debrah and Anteneh (1991) also suggest that--other things equal-
proximity to collection point (within 3 km) is more important than proximity to final
market in explaining participation in dairy markets (Table 4).
Larger producers are by definition "collection points" of a sort, and thus may
benefit from milk collection costs lower than those for smallholders. Furthermore,
the way that transactions costs affect institutional and organizational structures,
although little explored empirically for dairying in Africa, can be partially examined
through observed marketing arrangements. For example, the issue of proximity to
collection point in explaining participation in dairy cooperatives comes up time and
again in East Africa. 5 In sum, there is evidence from a number of countries that
suggests that both smallholder and large-scale dairy producers face transactions
costs, but they are of different levels, and they influence production and marketing
behavior in a manner detrimental to efficiency and equity.

C.

Approach to the Case Studies

In the remainder of this paper, we further document the importance of
transactions costs in smallholder dairying in East Africa using data from recent

Most recently in a reconnaissance mission by the authors in March 1996 to
Uganda.

5
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Table 3:

Distribution of 1985 Wet Season Milk Sales for Dairy Producers8 in the
Addis Ababa Milkshed.
Large Producers

Market Outlet

Small Producers

( percent of total sales)

8

Individual consumers

26

91

Hotels and restaurants

39

o

Government institutions

35

9

Averages from 16 large and 16 small producers.

Source: Debrah and Anteneh (1991).

Table 4:

Average Daily Sales of Dairy Products per Dairy Cow by Smallholder
Farmers in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, July 1986.

Producer
Distance from
Collection
Center (km)

Producers (N=16)
0-20 km from Addis Ababa
Milk
All Dairy

Producers (N=16)
20-85 km from Addis Ababa
Milk
All Dairy

(liters sold per cow, liquid milk equivalents 8 )

0-3 km
3 -10 km

0.74
0.12

2.06
1.81

1.78
0.05

1.78
1.09

Other dairy products sold include butter and cheese; calculations assumes that
1 kg butter requires 24 liters of fresh milk and that cheese output is a by-product of
butter-making.

8

Source: Calculated from Debrah and Anteneh (1991).
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surveys of dairy cooperatives in Central Province, Kenya, and of dairy producers in
the Addis Ababa, Ethiopia milkshed. 6 In the absence of direct estimates of the
transactions costs incurred by economic agents in the dairy marketing chain, we
discuss the indirect evidence of the nature and behavioral implications of
transactions costs for milk-producing households. Our guiding hypothesis is that
the influence of transactions costs can be explored through differences in observed
marketing costs, marketing channels used, costs of inputs (including the capital
necessary for entry into dairying), and prices received for milk and dairy products.
The role of organizations in reducing transactions costs is explored through
differences in the prevalence of dairy cooperatives, and resultant differences in
dairy marketing patterns, in Kenya and Ethiopia.
To the extent possible, we explore the additional hypothesis that smallholder
producers face higher transactions costs in dairy production and marketing than do
larger producers. The existence of this phenomenon raises the questions as to how
both sectors can co-exist over time in the same market, the extent to which policy
interventions have created the dualism, and whether the dualism is desirable.

IV.

TRANSACTIONS COSTS IN DAIRY MARKETING IN KENYA

In Kenya, 93 percent of urban milk supply in 1992 was handled by dairy
cooperatives (FAO, 1993). Developed mainly since independence and with
substantial state support, dairy cooperatives playa critical role in enabling the
participation of smallholder producers in the formal urban milk market. In principle,
dairy cooperatives serve to reduce transactions costs facing individual producers
through pooling risk, lowering unit collection costs, making inputs available, and
enhancing bargaining power. For processors, cooperatives may lower raw milk
acquisition (search) costs and make milk supplies more reliable. Raw milk from
cooperative members is transported (usually by the farmer or a farm household
member) to nearby collection points. Milk is then delivered by the cooperatives to
private buyers or collection centers or plants belonging to the Kenya Cooperative
Creameries (KCC). Although registered as a private limited company, the KCC is
effectively a parastatal (Grosh, 1991; Jaffee, 1995). Prices paid to cooperatives by
the KCC are set by the government, are subject to major political considerations,
and are uniform throughout the large highland collection area that extends for more
than 300 kilometers from Nairobi, the main center of urban milk demand (Leonard,
1991 ).
The KCC is mandated to act as "buyer of last resort", so as to provide a
guaranteed market outlet for smallholder producers. Until 1992, the KCC had a
monopoly on fluid milk sales in urban areas. Although no detailed study of the issue

The Addis Ababa case study draws heavily on the data and insights in Staal
(1995).
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exists, the provision of stable prices and market outlets by the KGG most likely
reduced price and market outlet risk for smallholder dairy producers. The resulting
lower search costs, and lower risk to smallholders who invested in specialized dairy
production probably contributed to the success of smallholder dairying in Kenya,
although withdrawal of KGG's monopsony on milk procurement is a key element of
future progress (Jaffee, 1995).
In recent years however, KGG's financial performance has been severely
compromised by pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing policies adopted for
political reasons (Grosh, 1991 and personal communication). In Kenya as in most
of Africa, rainfall and pasture are seasonal. Milk production in the dry season is
consequently dependent on purchased feeds, which raises costs. Pan-territorial
procurement pricing appears to treat producers in different parts of the country
equally; pan-seasonal pricing appears to treat those organized for industrial milk
production with concentrate feeding equally per liter of milk output with smallholders
using cut forages. In fact, it meant that KGG was forced to pay relatively high
procurement prices when milk is abundant in the rainy season, leading to a glut of
processed milk products in cold storage, and to be faced with a shortage of willing
suppliers in the dry season, when retail milk prices are higher (Ibid.).
The squeeze on KGG's balance sheet has resulted in a number of dramatic
changes affecting the nature and magnitude of transactions costs for smallholder
dairy producers in Kenya. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the milk prices paid
by the KGG to cooperatives and subsequently to producers did not keep pace with
increases in input prices. This was also due to inefficiency in the KGG's collection
and processing operations, in addition to political considerations regarding prices
of milk to consumers. Most importantly, payments by the KGG to cooperatives for
milk supplied were delayed, sometimes for months. In return, cooperatives were
forced to delay payments to producers, who were subsequently faced with higher
risks and irregular cash flow. Producers began to shift more sales to the informal
raw milk market, in spite of higher variation in both the availability of a market outlet
and prices, incurring the search costs required to locate new buyers. Supplies to
the KGG fell and, coupled with poor rainfall, in 1991 produced dramatic shortages
of processed dairy products in urban areas. Encouraged by donors, in 1992 the
Kenyan government liberalized the dairy industry, revoking the KGG's monopoly on
urban milk sales (Staal and Shapiro, 1994).
Although the liberalization applied only to sales of processed milk in urban
areas, with raw milk sales still officially illegal, it was interpreted differently by milk
producers, processors, and traders. By many, liberalization was taken to mean that
all manner of milk market transactions were permitted. As a consequence, the
period since 1992 has seen the rapid development of a variety of milk market
innovations, mainly in raw milk markets. These include "self-help groups" which
collect and market raw milk. These are not registered as cooperatives and so
unconstrained by restrictive cooperative laws.
Emerging private market
intermediaries now fulfill the same role. Further, dairy cooperatives themselves,
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once an integral part of the formal KCC milk collection system, are marketing a
greater proportion of their milk raw to urban markets.
The growth in raw milk marketing by cooperatives can be seen as a response
to the continued uncertainty of milk payments by the KCC. Producers regularly
report that their primary complaint is not the price paid, but the delays in payment.
To avoid the payment delays that characterize the present KCC collection system,
producers and cooperatives must incur the costs of searching for alternative market
outlets, and the related costs of screening, bargaining, and monitoring contractual
agreements with individuals and firms that are new to them. Some, such as self
help groups, may require collective effort to establish themselves. In this new
environment, the search for outlets providing reliable payment has implied
considerable uncertainty to many producers and cooperatives. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that a number of cooperatives are uncertain about the quantity of milk they
will be able to market on a given day, which illustrates that smaller marketing units
introduce a different set of complications compared to the omnipresent parastatal.
Cooperative members say that they often must market milk on public transportation
(which they describe as unreliable for their purposes), and lack the savings or credit
to buy cooling or transportation equipment. Further study of the magnitude of these
transactions costs, and of appropriate policy responses to this environment of
greater uncertainty, thus appears merited.
A survey of private dairy cooperatives in three districts of Central Province
provides additional evidence on the impacts of transactions costs in dairy marketing.
Transportation costs, and the related issues of time required to transport milk to
cooling centers and resultant milk quality, imply that the ability of private
cooperatives to market milk outside of KCC channels is limited by access to the
Nairobi market. A survey of 30 dairy cooperatives carried out in early 1996
(Owango et ai, 1996) assessed changes in cooperative operations since 1990. 7
Kiambu district borders Nairobi, with its center only some 25 kms from the city.
Thika and Muranga districts are further afield, centered 50 and 80 kms away,
respectively. Data were collected on amounts of milk marketed to the KCC and
other outlets by sample cooperative members in each district, and prices paid to
cooperative members for milk. Alternative market outlets that have grown in
importance in the three districts include direct sales to individuals, sales to market
intermediaries, and to private dairy processors making mainly non-liquid milk
products. Of these, sales to individuals are the most important. 8 Kiambu, the
closest district to Nairobi, exhibited a dramatic decline in the share of output going

This was a joint study by the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARl), and
the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), and is the source of data for
this section.
7

Sales to individuals constituted on average 45 percent of Kiambu cooperative milk
sales in 1995, and 27 percent in Muranga.

8
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to the KGG, whereas in Muranga, the most distant, KCG's share of sales declined
only marginally. Thus proximity to Nairobi may be an important determinant in the
decision to sell to KCC, as would be expected in the case of parastatal procurement
where prices are not fully set by market forces.
Transactions costs are likely to rise more quickly with distance from the urban
market than do straight-forward transport costs, due to risks associated with limited
information about distant marketing outlets, and the increased costs of screening,
bargaining with, and monitoring distant trading partners. The approximate costs per
liter of transporting milk by self-help groups in Thika were calculated by the authors
to be KSH 0.03 per liter per kilometer. Thus, milk transported a distance of 80
kilometers would incur transport costs of KSH 2.4 per liter, or more than 20 percent
of the KGC price. Muranga cooperatives continue to sell most of their milk to the
KCC at KSH 11 per liter, whereas raw milk sales in Nairobi and other urban areas
in the districts obtain a minimum of KSH 15 per liter. Transportation and search
costs that rise rapidly with distance most likely explain much of this choice of market
outlet. These transactions costs are related to the high perishability of raw milk,
which reduces time available for marketing, and raises risks of spoilage with
distance. In the case of the more distant Muranga cooperatives, the transactions
costs necessary to obtain higher prices in urban markets appear be greater than the
losses imposed by the uncertainty and delay of KCC payments.
These same factors can be seen at work in a comparison of changes in real
milk prices paid to producers by the cooperatives surveyed during 1990-1995. 9
Real prices rose most significantly in the two districts (Kiambu and Thika) closest
to Nairobi. These price increases are primarily due to increased sales by Kiambu
and Thika cooperatives to alternative raw milk outlets. Thus, some cooperatives
appear able to at least partly offset the increased transactions costs implied by new
marketing opportunities with higher prices for their product.
Both price and market outlet changes observed among peri-urban Kenyan
dairy cooperatives indicate the important role of transactions costs in determining
marketing behavior. Importantly, these changes began with a policy reform, that of
liberalization of the dairy market. Although many of the impacts were unintended,
this liberalization permitted market actors to avoid uncertainty due to the KCG. As
a result, cooperatives began to explore alternative market outlets, but only in the
regions where transportation and other transactions costs permitted. Further
market reform that formalizes and finalizes the still-tentative reform of dairy
marketing channels is likely to create more reliable demand by non-KCC
processors, and therefore larger milk collection areas.

Prices to producers are set based on prices received, cooperative costs, and a
capital levy. Nominal prices were deflated using average annual CPI changes
reported by the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics.
9
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V.

PERI-URBAN AND URBAN DAIRYING IN THE ADDIS ABABA MILKSHED

Dairying in the Addis Ababa milkshed in Ethiopia offers an additional
opportunity to examine the potential effects of transactions costs on the structure
of dairy production and marketing. Most milk and dairy product marketing in
Ethiopia occurs through the informal sector, and so is subject to market forces. Few
large farms or collective marketing organizations exist, so production and marketing
costs reflect the dispersed and small-scale nature of dairy sector organization. Dairy
producers in the Addis Ababa area can be classified into two types: urban
producers operating "backyard" dairy units, and peri-urban producers operating in
a mixed crop-livestock system.
Peri-urban producers in the Addis Ababa milkshed are generally based within
households whose primary economic activities are agricultural. The use of animal
traction and accompanying traditions of animal husbandry allows improved dairy
animals to be incorporated into existing agricultural practices. Major crops in the
area include wheat, barley, lentils, and oats. In some areas of lower elevation, the
traditional Ethiopian grain teft (Eragrostis te~ can be found. A minority of producers
live in or near small towns and also pursue wage labor. Even those producers in
small population centers generally have access to agricultural land. In addition to
land allocated to households, communal grazing land is available to some
producers.
Urban producers are defined as those who live in the greater Addis Ababa
area and have no access to agricultural land. They use zero grazing or semi-zero
grazing practices, depending on the level of street-side grazing employed. They
tend to rely more heavily on the income from their dairy activities than do peri-urban
producers. Milk is produced in "backyard" operations, utilizing space available in
residential compounds. Compounds are not generally designed or enlarged
specifically to accommodate dairy production. Cattle sheds typically are simple
structures of corrugated metal sheeting or mud and wattle and floored with blocks
of stone. Aside from milk sheds, fixed inputs are minimal, including a few buckets
and milk cans, a water barrel, and brooms. Larger urban producers may possess
a water pump and a sprayer for application of pesticides.

A.

The Survey

A survey of dairy operations was carried out in two rounds during 1992 and
1993; producers were asked to describe the activities of their dairy farms within the
previous 12 months. Nine survey sites were selected, five within the city limits of
Addis Ababa. The other four were within 60 km. of the city. Regional clusters were
averaged and subjective reliability indicators were computed based on enumerator
measurements and recall items; the 231 respondents were then ranked for
"reliability" and the bottom third of the "reliability" distribution were eliminated (see
Staal, 1995). Besides the geographic division between peri-urban and urban, which
attempted to incorporate the main dairy systems known to operate in the milkshed,
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the distribution of herd sizes in tropical livestock units (TLU=450 kg live weight)
showed two distinct modes in terms of herd size, in both the urban and peri-urban
samples. The two locational samples were then statistically clustered into "small"
and "large" ex post. 10 Sample characteristics are shown in Table 5.
The analysis that follows is based on responses from 77 small urban
producers, 44 small peri-urban producers, nine large urban producers and six large
peri-urban producers. Although the large producer samples are small, with only 131
large urban producers and 46 large peri-urban producers reported operating in the
Addis Ababa area, the samples represent 7 percent and 13 percent, respectively,
of the total populations.
Large producers in both urban and peri-urban locations tend to have about 7
times as many dairy cows as small producers. Large-peri urban producers also
have sizable herds of non-dairy cattle. Both large and small producers use cross
bred dairy cattle, and large producers, not surprisingly, use considerably more hired
labor, especially in urban areas.
Table 5:

Sample Characteristics (Means) for Dairy Producers Surveyed in the
Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992-1993.

Farm Characteristic
Number of operations
surveyed
Persons in household
Land operated (ha)
Hours of hired labor
used/month
Crossbred or purebred dairy
cattle (head)
Local cows (head)
Total herd (head)
Source:

Peri-urban
Small
Large
6
44

Urban
Small
Large
77
9

11.2
11.3
710

8.2
3.7
244

9.1

8.0

616

75

15.4

2.5

14.3

2.3

2.1
17.5

0.5
3.0

0.0
14.3

0.0
2.3

Producer survey carried out by Steven Staal and reported in Staal
(1995).

10 The clusters were based on the minimized sum of squared distances between
the cluster means.
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The largest amount of marketed milk is produced by small producers - 73
percent of milk marketed. Although 6,813 small producers with crossbred dairy
cattle were identified in 1993 by the Addis Ababa Dairy Producers' Association, only
177 large producers existed. 11

B.

Dairy Marketing

The sources of average dairy and dairy-related revenues and costs differ
between small and large producers, and between urban and peri-urban producers
of the same size (Table 6). There is considerable variation in the importance of
marketing outlets depending on scale of production and location. The remarkable
feature of the urban liquid milk supply, however, is the fact that 88 percent of all milk
is supplied as raw milk through the informal market. The parastatal collection
system, the Dairy Development Enterprise (DOE), handles only 12 percent of urban
milk supply, despite decades of government and donor efforts to expand its
presence. 12
Besides sales to the DOE, which only occur in peri-urban areas, important
market outlets include direct sales to individual customers, sales to hotels,
restaurants, retailers, and traders. The lowest average prices are paid by the Dairy
Development Enterprise (DOE), the dairy parastatal, followed by sales to
restaurants and hotels. Individuals pay the highest average prices for raw milk.
Large peri-urban farmers receive 44 percent of their dairy revenue from milk
sales to the DOE. The DOE operates a system of milk collection and cooling
centers (typically at 5-kilometer intervals) along the major roads radiating from the
capital. Farmers transport their morning milk to the collection centers spaced along
the road, where milk is weighed and tested for adulteration. Records of milk
supplied are kept, and payment is made monthly. In addition to its role as a buyer
of last resort, the DOE plays a role in provision of dairy inputs, especially feed.
Large peri-urban producers reported a desire to sell milk to the DOE, despite its
lower price, because in the past this helped ensure access to concentrated feeds
at subsidized prices. Larger producers professed a belief that diverting sales to
other outlets would undermine their

The association was formed by the large producers, and is thought to include all
of them.
11

The DOE operates a collection system in the peri-urban area along major roads
leading out of the capital. The milk is processed as sold primarily as packaged,
pasteurized milk in the urban area. The operations of the DOE are heavily
subsidized.
12
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Table 6:

Income from Various Market Outlets Received by Large and Small Peri
urban and Urban Dairy Producers in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992
1993.

Market outlet,
revenues or costs

Own consumption of milk (%)
Milk sales to dairy parastatal
Milk sales to individuals
Milk sales to hotels,
restaurants
Cheese and butter sales to
private institutions and
individuals
Income from cattle sales
(culling, etc.)
Total revenue
Total costs
Net returns

Peri-urban
Large

Urban

Small

Small

Large

( percent of total income)
12.3
3.3
9.1
17.6
43.8
0
12.3
15.7
29.5
35.0
11.6
65.9

8.5
0
42.7
36.9

3.6

15.8

0

1.0

19.6

3.7

1.4

10.8

(EB/MT)
1,126
1,145
610
968
158
535

1,188
1,069
119

1,174
955
219

Source: Staal (1995), Appendices C, D and unpublished data.

19
access to feeds available only through linked-transaction arrangements with the
DOE.
Feed subsidies through the DOE are being discontinued as part of overall
parastatal reform. Further, sales at low prices to the DOE suggests supply in
excess of demand in alternative (informal) markets. This "surplus" exists in spite of
the fact that many peri-urban producers selling to the DOE are located within 20
kms of the center of Addis Ababa. In Kenya this proximity to the urban center would
be considered ideal for marketing directly to urban consumers.
Unlike in Kenya, for a variety of historical and policy reasons, dairy
cooperatives are essentially non-existent in Ethiopia. 13 In the absence of
alternatives to the DOE for collective marketing, dairy marketing behavior close to
urban areas is strongly affected by individual transactions costs faced by individual
producers. Partly as a consequence of this, 68 percent of urban milk supply was
estimated to come from producers operating inside the urban area, and in close
proximity to consumers (Staal 1995). Small peri-urban producers sell only about 20
percent of their milk production to the DOE. They are able to obtain higher prices
for their remaining milk through sales to individuals and businesses in small
population centers. 14 Hotels and restaurants in peri-urban areas constitute points
of small but steady demand. Small peri-urban producers rely more than any other
group on home processing of milk, primarily into butter, which is then sold to
traders. This allows excess production to be conserved and transported, avoiding
some transactions costs due to spoilage or forced consumption, and improves upon
the low returns available through sales of small quantities to the DOE collection
centers.
Direct sales by producers to individual and institutional consumers, by
passing the dairy parastatal and private middlemen, constitute the bulk of milk sales
in the Addis Ababa milkshed, comprising 70 percent of total milk marketed. Post
farm processing activities playa relatively small role overall.
As a result of this, direct sales normally involve an informal contractual
arrangement, whereby a producer agrees to supply a certain quantity of milk daily
to the consumer. The price is then agreed on a Ethiopian Birr/liter /month basis for
milk supplied daily, and payment is made monthly. The milk is either delivered by
the producer or collected by the consumer. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these

13

See Staal 1995 for a description of the evolution of the dairy industry in Ethiopia.

14 Sales to individuals also allow the opportunity for adulteration of the milk with
water, which is more difficult in the case of DOE sales, which are tested. The
resultant uncertainty about milk quality may result in additional transactions costs
for consumers, and therefore affect overall demand for fluid milk.
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contracts are inflexible; consumers report that they cannot easily buy more or less
milk if their needs change. However, the contracting system appears to be adapted
to the seasonality of production and consumption15.
The higher prices obtained from sales to individuals attract most small urban
production, and much of large urban production. Small producers supply quantities
most appropriate for individual direct sales, their most important outlet. Large urban
producers' main outlet, however, is through sales to hotels and restaurants, which
constitute stable demand for their greater output. In sum, both producers and
consumers of dairy products in the Addis Ababa area appear to be put a premium
on contracting with only a small number of clients\suppliers, suggesting that
transactions costs are especially high in open milk markets.

C.

Milk Prices Received

The average milk prices received reported by peri-urban and urban dairy
producers during the survey period averaged EB/liter 1.03 for individual sales in the
peri-urban area and EB/liter 1.64 in the urban area. The DDE paid 1.00 EB/liter, a
price that is set administratively. Prices received for raw milk sales by different
producer groups are shown in Table 7. There is a notable difference between
small and large producers in prices received for hotel and restaurant sales, in both
urban and rural areas. The price that hotels and restaurants paid to small urban
producers is significantly less (p<0.01) than the price paid to large producers. This
price is also less than the price available from sales to individuals by either group.16
This price discount affecting sales by small urban producers can be perceived as
the cost to them of not being able to supply a larger quantity of milk (which may be
only 5-10 liters/day) on a more reliable basis to businesses that require a reliable
supply. This "cost"

15 In Ethiopia, dairy products are not consumed by Coptic Christians--roughly half
the popoulation--during the lenten fasting season. This has a major impact on
market outlets for dairy products and on dairy prices in the period before Easter.
16 Given the lack of a significant difference between prices received by large and
small producers for sales to urban individuals, and also relative to prices paid by
institutions to large urban producers, the range 1.60-1.65 EB/liter can be considered
a competitive retail price in urban areas.
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Table 7:

Average Raw Milk Prices Received, by Market Outlet and Producer
Type and Location (EB/liter).
Other outlets a

DDE b

0.95 (n=3)

Hotels and
Restaurants
2.00 (n=1)

NA

1.00

Large Urban

1.63 (n=5)

1.60 (n=3)**

1.54(n=3)

NA

Small Peri-urban

1.05 (n=14)

1.30 (n=3)

1.22 (n=5)

1.00

Small Urban

1.65 (n=49)

1.35 (n=10)**

1.21 (n=6)

NA

Producer Type

Individuals

Large Peri-urban

** Significantly different from each other (small and large urban) at (p<0.01)
a Other outlets include retailers, traders, etc.
b DOE prices were administratively set at 1 EB/liter.
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averages EB 0.25 per liter in the urban area, some 15 percent of the mean price of
sales to individuals. This price difference can also be taken as a direct estimate of
the cost that the small producer is willing to accept to sell milk to a presumably
more reliable contract buyer. In this case, hotels and restaurants may be acting as
"market outlets of last resort". Thus this price difference provides an estimate of
transactions costs particular to small producers due to the absence of alternatives
to the DDE collection system. Notably, no price difference in evident for individual
sales that are composed of smaller transactions (often 1-2 liters).
Factors explaining why producers of an ostensibly homogenous product would
repeatedly accept substantially lower prices in the same location and season from
one buyer compared to another can be investigated more formally with the data
from the producer survey. The price reported by respondents as the typical price
they accepted from a given outlet (institutional, retail, etc.) in a given season is
regressed against several characteristics of the producers in question and several
characteristics of their dairy marketing operations, exclusive of whom they were
selling to. These producer and transaction characteristics are independent of the
type of outlet selected by the producer. In a perfectly competitive market, all outlets
would pay the same price for the same good. In the market studied, different
producers faced different levels of transactions costs, depending on asset and
information levels, season and location. They responded to these differential
transactions costs by differential sales strategies.
The model regresses price accepted from a given outlet against farm
characteristics such as dummy variables for season and location of farm,
continuous variables for farm herd size, annual rental value of land operated by the
producer, daily hours typically required for milk delivery from the farm, and
transaction characteristics such as the typical cash cost of marketing milk to this
outlet, average daily milk sales to outlets of this type, and a dummy variable
whether this outlet is a regular customer of the farmer. Results for a variety of
disaggregations are shown in Table 8.
The "daily cash cost of milk marketing" and "daily hours of milk delivery"
variables tend to be collinear, which may account in part for the low significance
observed. When "cash cost" is dropped for the peri-urban sample alone, where
remoteness is more of an issue, the time required to market milk is significantly
negatively associated with the price that farmers can get for their milk. This
suggests that farmers located further away from Addis have significantly less
attractive options for disposing of their milk.
Otherwise, almost all other coefficients are statistically significant at 10
percent or better, and of expected sign when the high cost of moving milk over
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Table 8:

Determinants of Producer Prices of Fresh Milk in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992-1993
(dependent variable: average milk price received in EB/liter per producer and type of outlet).

Variable

Pooled Across Locations
Rainy Season

Intercept

Pooled Across Seasons

Pooled Across
Season/Location

Dry Season

Urban

Periurban

Coefficient

T-statistic

Coefficient

T-statistic

Coefficient

T-statistic

Coefficient

T-statistic

Coefficient

T-statistic

0.943

(16.2)

0.790

(10.1)

0.806

(16.1)

1.109

(26.1)

0.999

(6.7)

0.344

(8.5)

0.355

(6.3)

0.354

(10.5)

0.112

(4.2)

0.117

(3.8)

0.085

(1.8)

.093

(2.5)

0.107

(2.8)

-0.091

(-0.7)'

Dummies on the Intercept
Urban producers

-

Rainy season sales
Non-contract sales

0.084

(1.8)

0.095

-0.012

(-4.4)

-0.007

(-2.1 )

-0.009

(-4.3)

-0.000

(-0.1)'

-0.014

(-4.2)

Daily milk sales to that
type of outlet (It/day)

0.009

(3.8)

0.09

(3.2)

0.008

(4.8)

0.006

(2.9)

0.015

(1.6)'

Daily cash cost of
marketing to that type
of outlet (EB/day)

-0.009

(-0.2)'

0.107

(1.6)'

0.038

1.02'

0.033

(0.9)'

-

Daily hours used in
milk delivery

-0.013

(-0.5)'

-0.50

(-1.4)'

-0.030

(-1.3)'

-0.031

(-1.4)'

-0.304

(-2.25)

0.012

(5.2)

0.008

(2.8)

0.010

(5.5)

0.007

(3.7)

0.013

(3.7)

(1.6)'

Continuous variables
Herd size

Rental value of land,
including urban
compounds (000 EB)
No. observations

102

96

198

142

56

R2

0.65

0.50

0.58

0.39

0.44

Notes:

(1)
(2)

Note

2

Not significant at 10 percent.
"Cash costs of milk marketing" and "Daily hours used in milk marketing" were collinear in the small
periurban sample. "Cash cost" was therefore dropped in the periurban regression.
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distances with poor infrastructure is considered. Urban producers typically received
a significantly and substantially higher price, other things equal, confirming the
results in Table 7. Despite the greater availability of milk in the rainy season, prices
accepted were higher then. This seems to be due in part to greater difficulty in
delivering milk from rural areas to the city during the rainy season, as evidenced by
the stronger seasonal effect for the urban sample as compared to the peri-urban
one.
Another clear trend in the results are that a pattern of selling a relatively larger
amount of milk to the outlet in question tends to be positively associated with
receiving a higher per liter price, eet. par. This reinforces the view that consumers
are willing to pay more for adequate supplies from a given source. On the other
hand, farmers received less per liter on regular sales to the same source,
suggesting again that farmers were prepared to forego income for a regular outlet.
Finally, once these other effects are netted out, farmers with a higher level of capital
(proxied by the rental value of land and installations operated) per animal
(accounted for by herd size) still tend to receive higher payments per liter. This is
clear evidence that relative availability of assets (capital intensity) is associated, eet.
par., with being able to secure a higher price per liter for milk.

D.

Revenues and Costs

The average revenue per metric ton of milk in the survey was remarkably
similar across producer types. However the unit cost for large urban producers was
remarkably lower than for other types of producers. Thus the unit profit for large
urban producers was 4.5 times as high as for small urban producers and 2.5 times
as high as for large peri-urban producers. When average production levels are
taken into account, large urban producers made a profit in 1992-93 of more than
US$2,500, whereas small urban producers earned less US$70 net from dairying.
Large peri-urban producers earned US$700, and small peri-urban producers netted
about US$110. 17
The cost structures per ton of milk produced are shown in Table 9. Land
costs are obviously different between peri-urban and urban producers. In fact, other
evidence suggests that the land rents or opportunity costs incurred by peri-urban
producers were considerably in excess of their social values, in view of policies that
restrict access to land (Staal, 1995). Small peri-urban producers were able to
substitute pasture and labor for feed purchases. Table 9 shows

Profit calculations include "normal" returns to land, labor and capital, based on
current opportunity values estimated for each group of producers. Positive profits
may thus be considered "above normal" profits.
17
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Table 9:

Cost Structures of Large and Small Producers in the Addis Ababa Milkshed, 1992-1993 (EB/MT Milk
Produced).

Cost Category

Feed
Land
Fixed inputs except
animals
Family labor
Hired labor
Veterinarian/AI
services
Marketing
Dairy animals
Utilities
Total

Peri-urban

Difference

Urban

Large (PL)
439
209
92

Small (PS)
321
328
47

Large (UL)
317
24
95

Small (US)
561
92
73

13
67
47

55
92
27

14
52
23

41
32
13
954

40
39
18
968

16
24
45
609

Source: Staal (1995), Appendix C.

PL-PS
118
-119
44

UL-US
-244
-68
22

74
84
27

-42
-25
20

-60
-33
-4

. 31
62
64
1,068

1
-6
-5
-14

-15
-38
-19
-459
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the differences in cash values of inputs for large and small-scale producers. It is
clear that the cost advantage of large urban farmers per ton of milk stems in large
part from lower per unit feed costs, despite not having pasture land. The differences
in feed costs per kg are largely due to a policy of cheap disposal of edible industrial
by-products, which impacts primarily in the city, and primarily on larger producers.
However, it should be noted that economies of scale were also evident in land use
and labor use. The latter dwarfed economies of scale in marketing costs, veterinary
costs, artificial insemination cost, utilities and unattributed economies of scale due
to herd size.
Large farms required about 7 times more capital (based on amortized annual
costs) per farm than small farms in peri-urban areas and 8 times more capital than
small farms in urban areas. On a per cow basis, large farms are still 15 to 30
percent more capital intensive than small ones. On a per liter basis, large peri
urban farms are the most capital intensive and the small peri-urban farms the least
capital intensive.
The large per farm capital cost differences illustrate the potential for credit
market imperfections to limit entry into large-scale dairy production. Formal credit
is only available to those with existing collateral, which is constrained because land
is not privately owned. Formal credit applications also require submission of
detailed investment plans that may be beyond the skills and resources of many
dairy producers. Informal credit is available through rotating savings societies
(idder) , but the amounts available are small relative to capital needs for dairying.
Credit availability, combined with the capital intensive nature of large-scale dairying,
could partially explain the predominance of small-scale production.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence available from Kenya and Ethiopia about the role of transactions
costs in smallholder dairy marketing is largely indirect and anecdotal, rather than the
result of detailed direct observation of transactions costs. Nevertheless, certain
hypotheses are compelling. First, transactions costs in east African dairy are high,
as evidenced by the low percentage of milk production that is commercialized in
Kenya and Ethiopia, compared to that in developed countries.
Second, the size of the dairy operation, and its proximity to urban markets,
influence the products and market channels used by producers to market dairy
products. Transactions costs increase with distance, most likely faster than
transportation costs alone, due to the increased costs of information and risk of
dairy product spoilage before a buyer is found. The prices received by producers
also decrease with distance and appear to vary considerably depending on the size
of sales and the flexibility of contractual relationships between producer and
consumer. Smaller producers in the Addis Ababa milkshed appear to receive lower
prices than larger producers in some marketing channels. All producers appear to
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be willing to accept lower prices in exchange for a reliable outlet. Further, small
producers may incur greater transactions costs per unit of milk sold than large
producers when both sell to the dairy parastatal that serves as a buyer of last resort.
Finally, empirical analysis on the Ethiopian data shows that even when other
producer characteristics and transaction characteristics are accounted for,
producers with a higher degree of capital intensity per cow tend to be able to secure
higher prices per liter than those with a lower capital intensity. This is indicative of
an underlying explanation of differential transactions costs faced by different
producers: differential access to assets (and probably to differential information),
which may translate into greater market clout.
The role of organizations of collective action (such as processing parastatals,
cooperatives, "self-help" groups, etc.) in reducing transactions costs is a recurring
theme in smallholder dairy development in East Africa. When effectively managed,
such organizations reduce transactions costs for both the producers and the buyers
of dairy products. This reduction in costs typically is due to economies of scale in
collection and transport, and also because organizations reduce the need for
information about widely dispersed and small-scale buyers and sellers.
Kenya's experience with a parastatal processing company as a buyer of last
resort seems to indicate that a full-fledged government intervention such as KGG
can lower transactions costs during the start-up phase of smallholder dairy
development. Over time, however, political pressures begin to affect the parastatal,
particularly with regard to pricing policies. As a result, producers, cooperatives, and
private processors began to face higher transactions costs than necessary to take
advantage of market opportunities through the KGG. Attempts to circumvent this
problem by private parties appear to have led to attempts by the parastatal to
prevent competition from alternative institutional arrangements.
Comprehensive policy recommendations require a more detailed study of the
structure and determinants of transactions costs and their impacts on the behavior
of economic agents. However, the evidence already available suggests a number
of policy implications. First, because of the potentially important role of collective
organizations in lowering transactions costs in dairy marketing, government actions
to provide an enabling environment of regulations, enforcement and infrastructure
for well-managed cooperatives, self-help groups, and private enterprises would
promote smallholder dairy development. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, a more
supportive environment for collective action in the dairy sector would involve
reduction in the bureaucratic obstacles to effective formation and management of
cooperatives.
In both countries, government intervention in cooperative formation and
decision-making appears to transcend that necessary to protect cooperative
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members and their customers 18 . It appears that governments can productively
intervene to support the flow of information (about market opportunities and prices,
for example) to dairy marketing organizations, to provide resources for training in
management and planning of their decision makers, and under appropriate
circumstances, to support greater access to credit for capital expenditures identified
by the organizations as priorities (vehicles and cooling equipment, for example).
Another action that appears necessary to support smallholder dairy
development is greater transparency of dairy marketing policies, and greater
consistency in their implementation. In Kenya, greater transparency is likely to be
required with regard to fluid milk marketing by private processors in urban areas.
The 1992 liberalization has yet to be finalized, perhaps discouraging investment and
marketing activities by private dairy companies, including producer-based
cooperatives. Ethiopia's policy concerning privatization of state dairy farms and the
dairy parastatal has yet to be made definitive.
The implications for researchers are perhaps the most clearly defined.
Despite agreement that transactions costs have potentially large impacts on market
integration, and therefore development in general, few studies exist that document
the level and determinants of transactions costs. The nature of transactions costs
renders a full accounting of their nature and impacts difficult. Yet opportunities exist
to better document transactions costs that are, in principle, observable. These
observable transactions costs include: the opportunity costs of time spent by
producers in marketing, direct transportation and processing costs; losses due to
spoilage resulting from uncertain market outlets; and the degree to which market
outlets used by producers change over time (resulting in additional search costs).
Costs incurred by producers for transactions to obtain inputs, especially feed, credit,
land, and labor, may have especially important impacts and also deserve detailed
study.
Finally, a comprehensive study of transactions costs in dairy marketing would
account for transactions between numerous agents in dairy marketing channels,
including producer decisions to sell milk to more than one buyer, often under quite
different contractual terms. Perhaps what is most needed is methodological
development with regard to conceptualization of transactions costs and how to
measure them. Research on household and sub-sector models that beUer integrate
both existing transactions costs, but also the institutions and contracts that govern
individual transactions, would be beneficial in a broader sense. Such models would

For example, in Kenya, all expenditures over KSH 5,000 (currently about $100)
must be approved by the District Cooperative Officer, and approval of the Ministry
of Cooperative Development is required to appoint and dismiss key cooperative
management positions. In Ethiopia, government agencies are reputed to have
claimed ownership of dairy processing equipment purchased by groups of
producers under dairy development projects.
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not only provide improved policy insights for dairy development, but ultimately would
promote the well-being of rural smallholders by improving their ability to respond to
an ever-changing economic environment.
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